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Abstract 
 Since South Africa’s political transition in 1994, corruption has 
been a major feature of the country’s politics. However, the 
complexity of post-apartheid South African politics has 
sometimes prevented allegations and suspicions of corruption 
from being adequately dealt with by the law. This article 
examines the legal framework used to combat public 
procurement corruption in South Africa. Using a comparative 
approach, the article also examines the legal framework of Hong 
Kong – with a view to identifying lessons that South Africa can 
learn therefrom. Such lessons include but are not limited to 
Hong Kong’s specific laws dedicated to public procurement, its 
particular legislative and institutional features, its commendable 
constitutional commitment to eradicating corruption, and the fact 
that Hong Kong’s rules pertaining to procurement processes are 
more consistent and are not hidden in several legislative 
prescripts. South Africa may also do well to learn from the 
successes of Hong Kong’s iconic anti-corruption agency, the 
Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) – in 
attempting to model its own anti-corruption agency. 
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1 Introduction 
Since South Africa’s political transition in 1994, a major feature of the 
country’s politics has been the centrality of issues around corruption in 
terms of public controversy. Although allegations and suspicions of 
corruption have plagued high-level government officials and politicians, the 
complexity of post-apartheid South African politics has at times prevented 
these allegations and suspicions from being dealt with by the independent 
hand of the law. Instead, they have been handled in politically expedient 
ways. Perhaps the point needs to be made in passing that corruption in 
South Africa is not confined to high-profile matters involving senior 
politicians or bureaucrats. Case law in this area tends to show that 
corruption pays a part in state procurement processes, whether or not 
senior political figures or bureaucrats are involved. 
Corruption occurs in both the public and private sectors. However, the 
occurrence of corruption in the private sector has not enjoyed nearly as 
much attention as its occurrence in the public sector. This is because 
corruption in the public sector involves the resources and commodities 
that legally and rightfully belong to the public, and which are administered 
by public figures in trust, and on behalf of the public. Although it is widely 
accepted that public procurement is an area that is particularly susceptible 
to corruption, and while much has been written about corruption in 
general, not much has been written about corruption in the public 
procurement context specifically.  
This article highlights the legal framework that is used to combat public 
procurement corruption in South Africa. It also examines the legal 
framework of Hong Kong with a view to identifying lessons that South 
Africa can learn therefrom. There are several reasons why Hong Kong is 
chosen as a comparator. Hong Kong, like South Africa, has in place a 
common law legal system. During its time as a British colony, Hong Kong 
was criticised as being one of the most corrupt places in the world,1 but it 
no longer bears this stigma. The 2014 Transparency International 
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1   Kwok Man-wai 2005 http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no69/16_P196-
201.pdf. 
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Corruption Perception Index ranked Hong Kong 17th out of a total of 175 
countries.2 In comparison, South Africa was ranked 67th in the same index. 
It has been said that: "Hong Kong has transformed itself from a graft-
plagued city into a place distinguished by its strong anti-corruption 
regime".3 The success in reducing corruption so significantly in Hong 
Kong, is attributable to a number of factors, including support from the 
legislature. Indeed, there are a number of lessons that South Africa can 
learn from the Hong Kong experience. 
Public procurement has been defined as "the process by which 
governments and regional and local public authorities or bodies governed 
by public law purchase products, services and public works".4 Williams 
and Quinot define public procurement as the "purchasing by a government 
of the goods and services it requires to function and pursue public 
welfare".5 Corruption in the public procurement system subverts the 
constitutional principles on which the system is based, and failure by 
government to control and prevent corruption in this sector amounts to 
government's failure to meet its constitutional mandate. Before we 
examine that constitutional framework, a brief understanding of the 
international dimension is necessary. 
2 The international dimension 
International law plays an important role in the South African legal 
system.6 Since its constitutional recognition in South Africa, the courts 
have considered international law in most cases wherein international law 
is relevant. Perhaps the most well-known judgment which confirms the 
authority of international law in South Africa is Hugh Glenister v President 
of the Republic of South Africa7 (hereafter Hugh Glenister), wherein the 
Constitutional Court pronounced as follows while referring to anti-
corruption international conventions to which South Africa is a signatory: 
The obligations in these Conventions are clear and they are unequivocal. 
They impose on the Republic the duty of international law to create an anti-
corruption unit that has the necessary independence. That duty exists not 
                                            
2   The Index ranks countries and territories on how corrupt their public sector is 
perceived to be. The lower the number the less corrupt the country is perceived to 
be, relative to other countries. See Transparency International 2014 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results#myAnchor1. 
3   Lam 2013 http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No83/No83_16VE_Lam.pdf. 
4   Essig et al Strategic Use of Public Procurement 7. 
5   Williams and Quinot 2007 SALJ 340. 
6   See ss 39(1)(b), 232 and 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. 
7  Hugh Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) 
(Hugh Glenister). 
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only in the international sphere, and is enforceable not only there. Our 
constitution appropriates the obligation for itself, and draws it deeply into its 
heart, by requiring the state to fulfil it in the domestic sphere.8 
With regard to the eradication of corruption, South Africa is a signatory to 
several international or regional instruments including the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),9 the Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime,10 the Southern African Development 
Community Protocol Against Corruption,11 the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions12 and the 
African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption.13 International anti-corruption instruments play a critical role in 
the fight against corruption. They enunciate principles and set universal 
and legally binding standards which signatory states undertake to be 
bound by. Such documents "foster both the domestic action and 
international co-operation needed to tackle the many facets of 
corruption".14 Taking into account the role which international law plays in 
the South African legal system and the number of international anti-
corruption instruments to which South Africa is party, it is clear that 
international law is relevant to any enquiry relating to whether a specific 
body of law contains sufficient anti-corruption mechanisms.  
In the context of public procurement, the 2011 UNCITRAL15 Model Law on 
Public Procurement (hereafter the Model Law) is the most relevant 
international instrument. It contains international best practices on public 
procurement procedures and principles in a national setting, seeks to 
harmonise public procurement processes across nations, and has been 
lauded by experts as being unique relative to other international public 
procurement texts.16 For example, the World Trade Organisation’s 
Government Procurement Agreement17 tends to apply to international 
public procurement and international trade, while the Model Law provides 
procedures and principles which may be applied by nations in domestic 
                                            
8   Hugh Glenister para 183. 
9   United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) (UNCAC). 
10   United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
11   Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (2003). 
12   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1999). 
13   African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003). 
14   OECD date unknown http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/internationalconventions.htm. 
15   United Nations Committee on International Trade Law. 
16  Such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement, 
the UNCAC, or the various European Union Directives on Public Procurement. 
17   WTO Government Procurement Agreement (1994), as revised in 2011. 
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procurement. It is therefore helpful to those nations undertaking legal 
reform in public procurement.  
The Model Law also serves as a guide on various aspects of the open 
tendering process, including inter alia best practices pertaining to 
communication during a procurement process,18 the participation of 
suppliers or contractors,19 the qualification of suppliers and contractors, 
the minimum information to be disclosed in solicitation documentation and 
invitations to tender,20 evaluation and award criteria,21 rules pertaining to 
requests for information or clarifications sought by bidders,22 rules 
regarding the acceptance of the successful bid,23 rules regarding the 
manner in which records of procurement proceedings are to be 
maintained,24 various methods of procurement,25 the manner in which 
tenders are received, opened and evaluated,26 and challenge 
proceedings.27 A criticism of the Model Law, however, is that like most 
other public procurement texts, the focus is mainly on the selection and 
award stages of procurement. Notwithstanding this criticism, the Model 
Law has served as a benchmark for many countries, including South 
Africa, in reforming their public procurement regimes, as will be seen 
below. 
3 The constitutional dimension 
Section 217 of the Constitution provides the constitutional basis for public 
procurement in South Africa. Section 217(1) sets out five constitutional 
principles on which all procurement practices must be based: fairness, 
equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness. Subsection 
217(2) recognises that public procurement may be used as a tool to 
promote social and policy objectives by promoting the development of 
previously disadvantaged groups, for example.28 In order to fully 
appreciate the constitutional framework, it would be prudent to briefly 
highlight, now, each of the five principles enunciated in section 217(1).  
                                            
18   Article 7 of the Model Law. 
19   Article 8 of the Model Law. 
20   Articles 10, 37 and 39 of the Model Law. 
21   Article 11 of the Model Law. 
22   Article 15 of the Model Law. 
23   Article 22 of the Model Law. 
24   Article 25 of the Model Law. 
25   Article 27 of the Model Law. 
26   Articles 40-43 of the Model Law. 
27   Chapter VIII of the Model Law. 
28   Bolton Law of Government Procurement 34. 
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Fairness, as an abstract concept, is difficult to define. According to Baxter 
"… as a bare concept, fairness has no meaning, but the meaning 
accorded to fairness in any given situation will be a conception of 
fairness".29 It is trite law, however, that fairness is often defined in terms of 
procedural fairness and substantive fairness. The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act30 (PAJA) sets out the elements of a procedurally 
fair administrative action.31 These elements largely reflect the well-known 
principles of natural justice. While procedural fairness is concerned largely 
with procedural safeguards and adherence to rules, substantive fairness 
refers to the reasons for a decision. This means that the decision must be 
reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case.  
Transactions entered into by virtue of public procurement result in 
contracts. However such contracts are not entirely akin to contracts within 
the private sector, wherein the contracting parties are bound and obligated 
only to one another, to the exclusion of non-contracting parties. A 
government is in a different position. As the custodian of public funds, 
government can be said to always have a fiduciary duty to the general 
public in all of its decisions, actions and/or conduct, including when it 
contracts for goods and services with the private sector. This fiduciary duty 
means that there must be fairness in the relationship between organs of 
state, fairness in relation to competing tenderers, and fairness to the 
general public. In this sense, fairness to the general public and fairness to 
competing bidders may entail more than just procedural fairness to 
prospective bidders, as it includes considerations about whether the 
decision or action in question is substantively fair in the light of the 
interests of the general public. Considering that government’s 
procurement decisions have a significant impact not only on the 
contracting parties but also on the general public, and seeing that section 
217(1) has allowed room for such an interpretation, it is submitted that 
fairness within the context of public procurement means both procedural 
and substantive fairness.  
As far as the principle of equity is concerned, Bolton’s view referring to the 
fair treatment of disparate groups in South Africa is instructive.32 She 
states that: 
Equity is a measure that compares one group with another, for example 
black with white, rural with urban, rich with poor and women with men. 
                                            
29   Baxter 1979 SALJ 633. 
30   Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). 
31   Section 3(2)(b)(a-e) of PAJA. 
32   Bolton Law of Government Procurement 50-51. 
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Instead of treating all groups exactly the same, groups who face different 
levels of resources and development should receive different treatment … 
Areas with the most vulnerable populations and worst facilities should 
receive more resources than more affluent areas. Thus, equity can be said to 
be aimed at improving the position of vulnerable groups in South Africa.33 
De la Harpe avers that in interpreting equity as contained in section 217(1) 
of the Constitution, the general tone and purpose of section 217 and of the 
Constitution as a whole is relevant.34 In that regard, he states that the 
utilisation of public procurement to address the legacies of Apartheid by 
the preferential treatment of previously disadvantaged South Africans may 
be equitable.35 In the circumstances, it is submitted that equity, in terms of 
section 217(1) of the Constitution, can be said to be aimed specifically at 
addressing the inequalities and unfair discriminatory practices of the 
past.36 During the apartheid era the procurement system in South Africa 
tended to favour "larger and better established entrepreneurs and did not 
create a favourable environment for small, medium and micro enterprises, 
in particular those owned and controlled by previously disadvantaged 
persons".37 In transforming its public procurement system, the post-
apartheid government aims to "realise the potential of public sector 
procurement as an instrument of policy in the socio-economic 
transformation process." This is clearly reflected in the Constitution, where 
provision is made in section 217(2)(a) and (b) for categories of preference 
in the allocation of contracts, and for the protection or advancement of 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. In this way, public 
procurement is used as a vehicle to effect socio-economic reform in South 
Africa. 
The interpretation of the constitutional principle of transparency is critical 
in any evaluation of laws aimed at combating corruption in the public 
procurement sector, because transparency is universally recognised as 
being indispensable in the fight against corruption.38 Apart from the 
context of section 217(1), the notion of transparency must also be 
interpreted in the light of the right to access to information, as contained in 
section 32 of the Constitution. It should also be seen in the context of 
section 33 of the Constitution, which affords every person whose rights 
have been adversely affected the right to be given written reasons for 
                                            
33   Bolton Law of Government Procurement 50-51. 
34   De La Harpe Public Procurement Law 281. 
35  De La Harpe Public Procurement Law 281. 
36   Bolton Law of Government Procurement 52. 
37   Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa (1997) (Gen N 
691 in GG 17928 of 14 April 1997). 
38  OECD 2007 http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/ 
44956834.pdf. 
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administrative decisions. Finally, transparency must take into account the 
secret and clandestine nature of procurement corruption. A transparent 
procurement system, in addition to ensuring that procedures are open to 
scrutiny, should ensure that actual reasons and underlying principles in 
terms of which decisions are made are fair, lawful, rational, and free of any 
venal intent. 
In understanding the contextual meaning and content of the constitutional 
principle of competitiveness, the Competition Act39 is a useful starting 
point, because its preamble clearly recognises that the past apartheid and 
other discriminatory laws and practices resulted in excessive 
concentration of ownership and control within the national economy, weak 
enforcement of anti-competitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions on 
full and free participation in the economy by all South Africans. As the 
largest buyer of goods and services in the country, government is uniquely 
placed to promote and advance competition in order to create a more 
robust economy from a commercial perspective, as well as an economy 
that fosters full and free participation by all who wish so to participate. 
Public procurement must therefore seek to achieve competitiveness in 
terms of this dual perspective. 
The commercial nature of competition implies that a wide range of 
suppliers ought to be given an opportunity to bid for government work, and 
government ought to then select the contractor whose bid represents the 
best value-for-money option.40 A procurement system that follows this 
approach will encourage the production and rendering of quality goods 
and services by commercial entities in the market, as competitors will 
understand that it is not only a low price which will secure them a public 
contract. In this way, public procurement advances competition, which 
results in an economy in which consumers benefit from superior quality 
goods and services.  
With respect to redressing past apartheid and discriminatory laws and 
practices, competition will of necessity involve a structured system of 
preferential procurement. This is provided for within section 217(2) of the 
Constitution. With respect to public procurement, it is only through a 
system of preference that the ideals, as contained in the Competition Act, 
of creating an economy that is open to greater ownership by greater 
numbers of South Africans can be achieved. As such, public procurement 
in South Africa is subject to specific preferential procurement laws. It is 
                                            
39   Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
40   De La Harpe Public Procurement Law 287. 
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therefore submitted that in order to satisfy the principle of competiveness, 
each procurement decision must be balanced in order to reflect the 
commercial nature of competition and the achievement of the ideals 
outlined in the Competition Act.  
Competition and cost-effectiveness are largely interconnected and 
interrelated, as both principles concern the attainment of value for 
money.41 According to De la Harpe, a cost-effective action can be 
described as being effective or productive in relation to its costs.42 
Therefore, in the example used above, while the initial cost of not utilising 
a competitive system may be higher, the action itself may be more 
effective, in that the prevention of delay may prevent further and more 
costly damage in the longer term. However, the danger in public 
procurement lies in the abuse of such methods and the unjustified non-use 
of competitive methods in the guise of emergency situations which in 
reality ought to have been anticipated well in advance. This will constitute 
a negation of the principle of cost-effectiveness.  
De la Harpe further asserts that a system is cost-effective when it is 
standardised with sufficient flexibility to attain best-value outcomes in 
respect of quality, timing and price, and demands the least resources to 
effectively manage and control the procurement processes.43 In this 
respect, cost-effectiveness is interconnected with competition, in that the 
lowest tender might not always be the best option. A product with a longer 
lifespan or cheaper maintenance costs might be more cost-effective than 
its cheaper counterpart. 
The principles of fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-
effectiveness, as set out here, must underpin all public procurement 
actions. Legislation governing public procurement and the implementation 
thereof must therefore promote these principles. The principles are the 
primary yardsticks against which all procurement processes and decisions 
must be tested. A public procurement system in South Africa, in order to 
pass constitutional muster, must reflect these five principles. While it may 
be difficult for any particular procurement decision to strictly reflect all five 
principles, the public procurement system, as a whole, must reflect the 
principles.  
Due to the considerable judicial attention that the constitutional 
procurement principles have attracted, a discussion of such principles 
                                            
41   Bolton Law of Government Procurement 40. 
42   De La Harpe Public Procurement Law 289. 
43   De La Harpe Public Procurement Law 290. 
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would be incomplete without reference to the relevant judicial 
jurisprudence. A discussion of the judicial approach to the interpretation of 
the constitutional procurement principles and the judicial approach to 
public tendering in South Africa is undertaken below. First, however, if 
meaningful legal reform has to be suggested, an evaluation of the 
domestic legislative framework is necessary. 
4 The legislative framework 
In South Africa, public procurement is extensively regulated.44 No single 
piece of legislation is applicable to all aspects of public procurement, and 
the rules pertaining to public procurement are found in several laws. Prior 
to 1994 public procurement in South Africa was centralised. Soon after 
1994 government introduced budgetary and financial reforms.45 The first 
phase of reforms began with the introduction of a new intergovernmental 
system which required all three spheres of government to develop and 
adopt their own budgets.46 This decentralised budgeting model also meant 
that heads of departments needed to have control over procurement 
expenditure, if each sphere of government and each department within 
government were to be held accountable for its own budget. New 
legislation was required. The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA),47 
for example, was adopted with the objective of modernising financial 
management and enhancing accountability. A basic principle of this 
modernised financial model is that managers must be given the flexibility 
to manage, within a framework that satisfies the constitutional 
requirements of transparency and accountability.48 This is the context 
within which the PFMA was drafted. It regulates financial management 
and is applicable to national and provincial government departments. It 
sets out procedures for the efficient and effective management of all 
revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities, and establishes the duties and 
responsibilities of government officials in charge of finances. Apart from 
section 38, which sets out the general responsibilities of accounting 
officers,49 the PFMA does not contain any more provisions directly related 
to the processes of public procurement. It is therefore not a statute 
dedicated solely to procurement or to supply-chain management practices. 
                                            
44   Bolton 2014 PELJ 2319. 
45  National Treasury Guide for Accounting Officers. 
46   National Treasury Guide for Accounting Officers. 
47   Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA). 
48   This is reflected in Part 5 (ss 36-45 of the PFMA). 
49   Section 36 of the PFMA defines an accounting officer as the head of a department or 
the chief executive officer of a constitutional institution.  
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Rather, it is an overarching statute regulating government finances at 
national and provincial level.  
The other pertinent statute is the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA),50 which is applicable to municipalities in the local sphere of 
government. The procurement provisions of the MFMA are similar to those 
of the PFMA, but contain more detail regarding the system.51 While the 
MFMA is also not a statute dedicated solely to procurement, Chapter 11 is 
dedicated to supply-chain management. It provides the legal framework 
for the implementation of an integrated supply-chain management process 
in local government. Section 112 prescribes that municipalities must adopt 
a supply-chain management policy which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective. This section also sets out certain minimum 
aspects which the supply-chain management policy must cover. In terms 
of section 115, the accounting officer is responsible for the implementation 
of the supply-chain management policy. The accounting officer must also 
take all reasonable steps to ensure that mechanisms are in place to 
minimise the likelihood of fraud, corruption, favouritism, and unfair and 
irregular practices. The MFMA also contains provision for contract 
administration after the tender award stage.52 Section 168(1)(a) provides 
that the Minister of Finance may make regulations or guidelines applicable 
to municipalities regarding any matter that may be prescribed in terms of 
the Act. It is in terms of this section that the MFMA Regulations and 
Treasury prescripts pertaining to municipal supply-chain management are 
issued.  
Of more relevance is the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 
(PPPFA), whose purpose is to give effect to section 217(3) of the 
Constitution by providing a framework for the implementation of the 
procurement policy contemplated in section 217(2) of the Constitution. The 
PPPFA therefore provides a framework for the recognition of socio-
economic components and the setting and evaluation of an award 
criterion. It does this by introducing a preference point system to be 
utilised in the evaluation of tenders.53 The PPPFA leaves it open to organs 
of state to decide what specific goals to award points for, but states that 
any specific goal for which a point may be awarded must be clearly 
specified in the invitation to submit a tender.54 The opinion has been 
                                            
50   Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA). 
51  Watermeyer "Regulating Public Procurement” 1, 3. 
52   Section 116 of the MFMA. 
53   Section 2(1) of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 
(PPPFA). 
54   Section 2(1)(e) of the PPPFA. 
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expressed that the aim of the PPPFA is to enhance the participation of 
historically disadvantaged individuals and small, medium and micro-
enterprises in the public-sector procurement system.55 The PPPFA itself 
states that specific goals may include "contracting with persons, or 
categories of persons historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
on the basis of race, gender or disability and implementing the 
programmes of the Reconstruction and Development Programme".56 The 
provisions of the PPPFA are applicable to all levels of government. 
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (LGMSA)57 provides that 
municipalities may procure the services of private persons to provide or 
perform a municipal service.58 The LGMSA makes it incumbent on 
municipalities, when they procure such services, to employ a competitive 
bidding process which complies with the relevant provisions of the 
MFMA.59 Sections 80, 81, 83 and 84 set out specific criteria to be met 
when a municipal service is provided through an external mechanism. 
With regard to the competitive bidding method, section 83(1)(d) requires 
that the selection process must make the municipality accountable to the 
local community regarding progress with selection and reasons for any 
decisions. These criteria are in addition to the criteria required to be met in 
terms of the MFMA and MFMA Regulations. The provisions of the LGMSA 
are therefore directly applicable to public procurement when the good or 
service procured is required to fulfil a municipal service.  
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)60 is also relevant, 
because its provisions and administrative law in general apply to public-
sector procurement. To a large extent, administrative law has been 
codified by PAJA, which sets the parameters within which correct 
administrative action must be taken. The provisions of PAJA impact on the 
public tender process and become particularly relevant when an aggrieved 
bidder opts to challenge a decision of an organ of state. If public-
procurement legislation does not contain satisfactory appeal or review 
mechanisms, then the aggrieved bidder will have no option but to resort to 
the use of PAJA. 
                                            
55   Bolton Law of Government Procurement 45. 
56   Section 2(1)(d) of the PPPFA. 
57   Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (LGMSA). 
58   Section 80(1)(b) of the LGMSA. A municipal service is defined in s 1 of the LGMSA 
as a service that a municipality in terms of its powers and functions provides or may 
provide to or for the benefit of the local community, irrespective of whether such 
service is provided through an internal or external mechanism and irrespective of 
whether fees, charges or tariffs are levied in respect of such a service or not. 
59   Section 83 (1)(a) of the LGMSA. 
60   Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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Several regulations have also been promulgated in terms of some of the 
statutes referred to above. These include the PFMA Regulations,61 the 
MFMA: Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations,62 and the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act Regulations.63 In addition, 
a large number of Treasury prescripts apply to public procurement in 
South Africa, but discussion thereof is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Suffice it to say, they are issued in terms of section 76(c) of the PFMA or 
section 168 (1)(a) of the MFMA.  
Finally, mention ought to be made of the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act (PCCA),64 which is the chief anti-corruption statute in 
South Africa, although it is not applicable to public procurement corruption 
only. As stated in chapter one, the PCCA provides a general offence of 
corruption,65 and creates offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to 
specific persons,66 offences in respect of parties in an employment 
relationship,67 offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to specific 
matters,68and miscellaneous offences relating to a possible conflict of 
interest and other unacceptable conduct69 – as well as "accessory to or 
after [an] offence", and "attempt, conspiracy and inducing another person 
to commit [an] offence".70 While there are other sections in the PCCA 
which could be applicable to corruption in public procurement, section 13 
is most relevant. It applies to corrupt activities relating to the procuring and 
withdrawal of tenders. Section 3 creates the general offence of corruption, 
whereas sections 24 and 25 create certain statutory presumptions and 
defences. Sections 29-33 apply to the register for tender defaulters. The 
                                            
61   Treasury Regulations for Departments, Trading Entities, Constitutional Institutions 
and Public Entities (2005) (GG 27388 of 15 March 2005). 
62  Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations (2005) (Gen N 868 in GG 27636 
of 30 May 2005). 
63  Preferential Procurement Regulations (2011) (GN R502 in GG 34350 of 8 June 
2011). The 2011 Regulations have replaced the Preferential Procurement 
Regulations (2001) (GN R725 in GG 22549 of 10 August 2001). 
64   Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PCCA). 
65   Section 3 of the PCCA. 
66   Sections 4-9 of the PCCA create offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to 
public officers, foreign public officials, agents, members of the legislative authority, 
judicial officers and members of the prosecuting authority respectively. 
67   Section 10 of the PCCA. 
68  Sections 11-16 of the PCCA create offences relating to witnesses and evidential 
material during certain proceedings, offences relating to contracts, offences relating 
to the procuring and withdrawal of tenders, offences relating to auctions, offences 
relating to sporting events, and offences relating to gambling or games of chance. 
69   Sections 17-19 of the PCCA. 
70   Sections 20-21 of the PCCA. 
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PCCA also provides for the establishment of a national register of tender 
defaulters in the Office of the National Treasury.71  
There is no doubt that South Africa has adopted a constitutional stance of 
committing itself to a procurement system that reflects the universal 
principles enunciated in the UNCAC. However, South Africa lacks in the 
formulation of a system which uniformly operationalises all such principles. 
A system which is an inconsistent system and where the rules are found in 
a plethora of different laws may promote ambiguities in conflicting 
provisions and the selective application of laws in order to disguise corrupt 
intentions. Moreover, the legislative framework is plagued by many laws 
and technical formalities, the abundance of which may create room for 
corruption. Furthermore, the legislative framework does not contain 
adequate or effective methods to detect acts of corruption, either prior to a 
tender award being made or after, and the provisions of the PCCA are 
insufficiently applicable to public procurement corruption. 
In order to understand how the law has been used or could be better used 
to combat public procurement corruption in South Africa, it is important to 
reflect on the role the courts can and do play. 
5 The role of the courts 
One of the criticisms of the judiciary is that the courts fail to notice or 
address the role that corruption may have played in cases involving the 
appeal or review of public procurement decisions. In Moseme Road 
Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors,72 the Court 
observed that "… sometimes the award has been tainted with fraud or 
corruption, but more often it is the result of negligence or incompetence or 
the failure to comply with one of the myriad rules and regulations that 
apply to tenders".73 Notwithstanding the real possibility that corruption may 
play a role in tender processes, courts tasked with the adjudication of 
tender appeals or reviews tend to overlook this aspect. In such instances, 
therefore, it is regrettable that the prevailing judicial approach is not mero 
motu to recognise possible corrupt intents which may have played a part 
in the entire process under review. This judicial reluctance is perhaps most 
clearly demonstrated in Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings v The 
                                            
71   Section 29 of the PCCA. 
72  Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors 2010 3 All SA 
549 (SCA). 
73   Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors 2010 3 All SA 
549 (SCA) para 1. 
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Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency,74 
wherein the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) refused to admit into 
evidence the transcript of a conversation between two individuals which 
revealed allegations or suspicions of corruption.  
It was noted earlier that the current legislative framework for public 
procurement is plagued by a plethora of law, thereby creating 
inconsistencies and/or ambiguities in the system. This was acknowledged 
in Dr JS Moroka Municipality v Bertram (Pty) Ltd,75 wherein the Court 
stated that: 
The necessity to comply with the obligations imposed by section 217 of the 
Constitution relating to public procurement policies and procedures to be 
adopted by organs of state, including municipalities, has resulted in the 
enactment of numerous interrelated statutes, regulations and directives. This, 
in turn, has given rise to a convoluted set of laws and requirements that have 
proved to be fertile ground for litigation with the law reports becoming littered 
with cases dealing with public tenders.76 
The other consequence, of course, is that the courts experience difficulty 
in focusing on the most relevant laws applicable in a given situation. This 
was evidenced in cases like South African National Roads Agency Limited 
v The Toll Collect Consortium77 and Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local 
Municipality v FV General Trading CC.78 In the latter case, the court failed 
to refer to an applicable law by not recognising that the initial oral contract 
was in violation of section 76(b) of the LGMSA. It should also be noted 
that strict and rigid adherence to the technical conditions of tenders and 
the plethora or rules may promote corruption. Several court judgments 
have pronounced on this aspect of the public tendering process. In Metro 
Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality79 the SCA was tasked with 
assessing whether non-adherence to the strict rules which disallowed a 
procuring entity to allow a tenderer to alter its offer after the close of the 
tender process was fair in the circumstances. In declining to hold that the 
process was fair, as the deviation was occasioned by subterfuge and 
deceit,80 the court referred to the "ever-flexible duty to act fairly".81 This 
flexible judicial approach is also seen in other cases. In Chairperson: 
                                            
74   Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings v The Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). 
75   Dr JS Moroka Municipality v Bertram (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 All SA 545 (SCA) para 8. 
76   Dr JS Moroka Municipality v Bertram (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 All SA 545 (SCA) para 8. 
77   South African National Roads Agency Limited v The Toll Collect Consortium 2013 6 
SA 356 (SCA). 
78  Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading CC 2010 1 SA 
356 (SCA). 
79   Metro Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality 2004 1 All SA 504 (SCA). 
80   Metro Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality 2004 1 All SA 504 (SCA) para 14.  
81   Metro Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality 2004 1 All SA 504 (SCA) para 11. 
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Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd, for 
example, the Court held that: 
… the definition of "acceptable tender" in the PPPFA must be construed 
against the background of the system envisaged by s 217(1) of the 
Constitution, namely one which is "fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective." In other words, whether "the tender in all respects 
complies with the specifications and conditions set out in the contract 
documents" must be judged against these values.82 
Courts have also occasionally determined whether non-compliance with 
conditions pertaining to the submission of tax clearance certificates 
constitutes a justifiable ground for disqualification. In VDZ Construction 
(Pty) Ltd v Makana Muncipality,83 where one of the conditions of the 
tender was the submission of an original valid Municipal Billing Clearance 
Certificate, the court held that the non-compliance of the applicant was 
one which was in mere form as opposed to substance, and therefore did 
not remove it from the definition of "acceptable tender" as defined in the 
PPPFA.  
Other cases that have come before the courts include Valozone 268 CC v 
Minister of Education,84 which dealt with the need to have legislative 
measures to ensure proper recordings of minutes of meetings; 
Groenewald v M5 Developments (Cape) (Pty) Ltd,85 which held that 
section 62 of the LGMSA is applicable to decisions pertaining to the award 
of tenders and that an unsuccessful tenderer did have a right of appeal in 
terms of section 62 against such decisions; and City of Cape Town v 
Reader,86 which held, inter alia, that in a tender appeal process 
unsuccessful tenderers and all parties to the tender approval process were 
entitled to appeal under section 62. Cases also include RMR Commodity 
Enterprise cc t/a Krass Blankets v Chairman of the Bid Adjudication 
Committee,87 which illustrates how delays in the tender process may 
prejudice an innocent, unsuccessful tenderer, and WJ Building and Civil 
Engineering Contractors CC v Umhlatuze Municipality,88 which illustrates 
the consequences of time delays encountered by an aggrieved tenderer in 
                                            
82   Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 
All SA 487 (SCA) para 14. 
83   VDZ Construction (Pty) Ltd v Makana Municipality (1834/2011) 2011 ZAECGHC 64 
(3 November 2011). 
84   Valozone 268 CC v Minister of Education (3285/14) 2014 ZAGPPHC 294 (26 May 
2014). 
85   Groenewald v M5 Developments (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 82 (SCA). 
86   City of Cape Town v Reader 2009 1 SA 555 (SCA). 
87   RMR Commodity Enterprise CC t/a Krass Blankets v Chairman of the Bid 
Adjudication Committee 2009 3 All SA 41 (SCA). 
88  WJ Building and Civil Engineering Contractors CC v Umhlatuze Municipality 2013 5 
SA 461 (KZD). 
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its request to a procuring entity for information pertaining to the reasons 
for its decision.  
A detailed discussion of all cases on public procurement corruption that 
have come before the South African courts is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Suffice it to say that the judicial position enunciated in the 
judgments highlighted above seems to stress that decisions to condone 
non-compliance with tender conditions should not be exercised in a 
mechanical and technical manner. Where decisions are taken to disqualify 
bids for their non-compliance with formal technical conditions which do not 
go to the heart of the process, then such decisions may very well serve to 
frustrate the constitutional principles entrenched in section 217(1) of the 
Constitution. Such flexible judicial reasoning is to be commended, as it 
values substance over form, and places the advancement of constitutional 
principles at the heart of the enquiry. That said, however, the case law 
supports the point made earlier, that public procurement in South Africa is 
subjected to too many laws, and that this results in uncertainties and 
ambiguities. There have also been instances where courts have failed to 
admit evidence in cases where the possibility of corruption was real. This 
judicial reluctance immediately thwarts any attempt to uncover corrupt 
acts. It is also evident that courts seem not to appreciate the nature of 
public procurement corruption in a manner which allows them to 
adequately come to the assistance of aggrieved bidders.  
Against the foregoing discussion on the South African legislative 
framework and judicial approach, the legal framework of Hong Kong is 
now discussed, with a view to identifying lessons that South Africa might 
learn therefrom. 
6 Lessons from Hong Kong 
During the 1960s and 1970s Hong Kong went through rapid changes 
characterised by massive population increases and the expansion of its 
manufacturing industry. During that time of social and economic 
development the government focused on delivering basic services and 
maintaining social order, and was unable to meet the growing needs of the 
people. This provided fertile ground for corrupt activities.89 Corruption in 
the public sector became a way of life and gained cultural acceptance, 
notably by the Chinese population.90 However, today Hong Kong is 
applauded for its anti-corruption efforts, most especially the efforts of its 
                                            
89   Unreported judgment of KwaZulu-Natal High Court, case number 4139/2013.  
90   Lee 1981 Asian Survey 357-361. 
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anti-corruption agency, the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC), whose establishment in February 1974 "marked the turning point 
in the British Colony’s fight against corruption".91 It must be stated, 
however, that comprehensive anti-corruption legislation is to be equally 
credited for the drastic reduction of corruption in Hong Kong. This is 
because "the concern with corruption led to the development of a number 
of legal norms and measures".92  
The Basic Law of Hong Kong93 is its constitutional document. As with the 
Constitution in South Africa, it is the supreme law in Hong Kong. A striking 
feature of the Basic Law is Article 57, which establishes the ICAC, which 
"shall function independently and be accountable to the Chief Executive". 
It must be pointed out that the South African Constitution does not contain 
any such provision relating directly to the eradication of corruption. Unlike 
the South African Constitution, however, the Basic Law does not contain 
any specific public procurement provisions. Chapter V of the Basic Law is 
dedicated to the economy, which includes public finances. Although sound 
financial management and good governance may be linked to public 
procurement,94 the Basic Law does not constitutionalise public 
procurement principles, as does the South African Constitution. 
6.1 Public procurement laws 
Public procurement in Hong Kong is based on the following principles: 
public accountability, value for money, transparency, and open and fair 
competition.95 Hong Kong appears to have in place a system of both 
decentralised and centralised public procurement. While individual 
government departments are authorised to procure goods and services on 
their own, in certain circumstances goods and services required by 
individual departments are procured by the Government Logistics 
Department or the Public Works Tender Board.96 In certain situations, 
procurement awards are also made by a Central Tender Board.97 The 
circumstances in which centralised or decentralised procurement is 
implemented are guided by the procurement legislation highlighted below.  
                                            
91  Quah 1994/95 Crime Law Soc Change 391.  
92  Lee 1981 Asian Survey 355. 
93  Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China (1990).  
94  This is seen in ch 3, where a 9(2) of the UNCAC is discussed, and is shown to link 
public procurement to good governance.  
95  Treasury Branch, Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau 2013 
http://www.fstb.gov.hk/tb/en/guide-to-procurement.htm. 
96  Audit Commission 2012 http://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/e59ch08.pdf. 
97  Audit Commission 2012 http://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/e59ch08.pdf. 
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The Public Finance Ordinance98 provides the legislative framework for the 
control and management of public finances. Its provisions are not 
applicable just to public procurement. In terms of this law, the Financial 
Secretary has a duty to prepare estimates of government revenue and 
expenditure, which are then submitted to the Legislative Council, which is 
empowered to authorise such expenditure against the general revenue.99 
In terms of section 5, the estimates’ expenditure must classify expenditure 
under heads and subheads, which are to include a description of each 
head, the estimated total expenditure under each head, the provision 
sought in respect of each subhead, the establishment of posts (if any), and 
the limit (if any) to the commitments which may be entered into in respect 
of expenditure which is not annually recurrent. This legislative duty on the 
Financial Secretary enables the authorising body – the Legislative Council 
– to have a clear and detailed understanding of government expenditure 
which is to be authorised for a particular financial year. The estimates’ 
expenditure required in terms of the Public Finance Ordinance may be 
referred to as the government procurement plan. In effect, therefore, the 
authorising body is favoured with a detailed procurement plan prior to the 
approval of the expenditure estimates.  
In terms of section 12, a controlling officer must be appointed for each 
expenditure head and subhead, and each controlling officer is responsible 
for expenditure from a particular head or subhead. Furthermore, 
controlling officers are also, if required, accountable to the Financial 
Secretary for the performance of their duties as controlling officers.100 The 
Public Finance Ordinance further entrenches the principle of accountability 
in section 15, which makes provision for controlling officers to be 
personally responsible for additional expenditure (ie not in line with annual 
estimates submitted by the Financial Secretary to the Legislative Council) 
incurred on an urgent basis, and where provisions of the Ordinance in 
respect of such expenditure were not followed. Thus the Public Finance 
Ordinance is not dedicated solely to public procurement, and its provisions 
create a sound legislative basis for accountable government expenditure.  
Public procurement in Hong Kong is governed mainly by the Stores and 
Procurement Regulations (SPR).101 Chapter Three regulates tender 
procedures for government procurement. These Regulations set out 
detailed procedures to be followed during a public tender process. 
                                            
98  Public Finance Ordinance (1983). 
99  Sections 5 and 7 of the Public Finance Ordinance (1983). 
100  Sections 12(2) and 13 of the Public Finance Ordinance (1983). 
101  Stores and Procurement Regulations (2016) (SPR). 
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Financial Circulars such as Financial Circular Number 4/2013 contain 
information pertaining mainly to issues like the setting of price thresholds, 
which may be amended from time to time. In terms of Regulation 300, the 
tender procedures set out in Chapter Three of the SPR are to be followed 
for the procurement of stores and services which exceed $1.43 million, 
and for construction and engineering services which exceed $4 million.102 
In other words, procurement above these thresholds cannot be 
undertaken in terms of other methods such as requests for quotations. 
Individual departments are authorised to procure goods not exceeding 
their direct purchase authority – ranging from $500 000 to $1.43 million. 
However, with respect to the procurement of services, individual 
departments may make purchases irrespective of value in accordance 
with the SPR.103 The Government Logistics Department purchases goods 
on behalf of departments which exceed $1.43 million, up to an amount of 
$10 million – unless such tenders fall within the ambit of other subsidiary 
tender boards such as the Public Works Tender Board. The Central 
Tender Board generally decides on the acceptance of tenders exceeding 
$10 million.104 The provisions of the SPR are applicable to departments, 
subsidiary tender boards such as the Government Logistics Department, 
and the Central Tender Board. In this way, Hong Kong has elements of a 
centralised and a decentralised procurement system.  
By being applicable to all departments and tender boards, the SPR 
presents a set of uniform procedures to be followed throughout 
government procurement in Hong Kong. The SPR also does not seem to 
allow for the formulation of independent procurement policies within 
different departments. Although the SPR makes provision for different 
tendering methods – such as selective tendering – where service 
providers on an approved list are invited to tender,105 the normal 
procedure adopted is open tendering.106 In terms of Regulation 316, open 
tendering involves a procedure wherein all interested service providers are 
free to submit tenders.  
Regulation 340 provides for the publication of invitations to tender in the 
government gazette, on the internet, and in local or international 
newspapers. Regulation 340(e) sets out minimum information which ought 
to be contained in a tender advert, which includes the closing date of the 
tender, contact details to obtain relevant tender documents, and the fact 
                                            
102  Refers to the Hong Kong dollar.  
103  Audit Commission 2012 http://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/e59ch08.pdf. 
104  Audit Commission 2012 http://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/e59ch08.pdf. 
105  Regulation 320(a) of the SPR. 
106  Regulation 315 of the SPR.  
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that late tenders will not be accepted. Regulation 340(f) also stipulates that 
in order to allow potential tenderers sufficient time to prepare and submit 
tenders, a minimum of three weeks is normally required before the closing 
date. The provision of sufficient time for tender preparation and 
submission may help reduce corrupt activities. In certain instances, corrupt 
officials may deliberately set an inappropriately short period before a 
tender closing date in order to ensure that only a few tenders are 
submitted, thereby reducing competition. These conditions pertaining to 
the advertisement of invitations to tender appear to be similar to the 
conditions set in terms of South African law.  
Regulation 345 sets out the criteria and information to be included in 
tender documents.107 As in terms of South African law, Hong Kong 
requires procuring entities to furnish potential tenderers the terms of the 
tender, the general and special conditions of contract, the tender 
specifications, the bills of quantities, and the price schedules. In this 
respect South African law also specifically requires procuring entities to 
disclose all of the evaluation criteria in the tender invitation.108 
Hong Kong elected to establish an independent administrative authority 
dedicated to receiving and reviewing challenges by suppliers, called the 
Review Body on Bid Challenges. The Rules of Operation of the Review 
Body109 set out clear time-frames within which complaints must be lodged, 
clear timeframes for subsequent responses from parties, and timeframes 
within which the Review Body is to render its decisions. In terms of clause 
13 of the Rules of the Review Body, a supplier may request a "rapid 
interim measure". This means that the Review Body may order the 
suspension of the procurement process pending the finalisation of the 
review.110 This model presents a solution for many of the challenges 
highlighted in the South African appeal and review system pertaining to 
public tenders. In the first instance, the Hong Kong model affords bidders 
certainty regarding the procedures to be followed and the timeframes to be 
adhered to. Furthermore, the independent body (rather than a court of law) 
provides a dedicated service which obviates the delays experienced in the 
normal court system. And the existence of the provision for interim 
                                            
107  For example, see Tender Form Gf 231 Tender for Services of the SPR. 
108  Regulation 4(3) of the Preferential Procurement Regulations (2011). 
109  Rules of Operation of the Review Body on Bid Challenges (2014). 
110  Article XVIII (1)(7)(a) of the Rules of Operation of the Review Body on Bid 
Challenges (2014) states that "the procedures may provide that overriding adverse 
consequences for the interests concerned, including the public interest, may be 
taken into account when deciding whether such measures should be applied". 
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measures for suspension of the procurement process ensures that 
reviews do not become mere academic exercises.  
6.2 Anti-corruption laws 
As far as anti-corruption legislation in general is concerned, the Prevention 
of Bribery Ordinance (POBO)111 is the main statute in Hong Kong. Section 
3 creates a general offence of soliciting or accepting an advantage without 
the general or special permission of the Chief Executive. "Advantage", as 
defined in section 1 of the POBO, includes almost any form of advantage 
or value, whether monetary or not. Section 4 creates a general offence of 
bribery in terms of which it is an offence for any person to offer an 
advantage to a public servant as an inducement in the performance of 
his/her duties. It is also an offence for a public servant to accept or solicit 
an advantage as an inducement to act in any official manner. The POBO 
in Hong Kong creates specific offences with respect to bribery. The 
provisions applicable to corruption in public procurement are contained in 
sections 5 and 6. The general offence of bribery in section 4 may also be 
applicable to government procurement. Section 5 relates to bribery for 
giving assistance with regard to contracts. The equivalent provision in the 
PCCA in South Africa is contained in section 12. As is the case in terms of 
the PCCA, the central elements for an offence in terms of section 5 of the 
POBO is the giving, acceptance or solicitation of an advantage and a 
concomitant act from the person so accepting or soliciting the advantage 
without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. Unlike section 12 of the 
PCCA, however, section 5 of the POBO seems to be confined to bribery in 
the public sector. Section 6 of the POBO relates to bribery for procuring 
the withdrawal of tenders. In terms of this section, any person who offers, 
accepts or solicits any advantage for the withdrawal of a tender or the 
refraining from making a tender without lawful authority or reasonable 
excuse shall be guilty of an offence. The South African equivalent of this 
section is found in section 13(1)(a)(iii) of the PCCA.  
Unlike the PCCA in South Africa, the POBO creates an offence of 
unexplained wealth. Taking into account the nature of public procurement 
corruption, the creation of an illicit enrichment offence may be useful in 
assisting the prosecution. Section 10(1) of the POBO places the burden 
on the accused to offer a satisfactory explanation regarding his or her 
standard of living or wealth. This burden on the accused is a reasonable 
one, given that in such instances it may be only the accused who is in a 
                                            
111  Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Ch 201) Hong Kong Laws. 
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position to offer a legitimate explanation regarding his/her wealth or 
standard of living. Section 12A also provides for confiscation orders to be 
sought from the court in respect of property or resources under the control 
of a person convicted of an offence under section 10(1)(b).  
The POBO also provides for the protection of informers in section 30A. 
This section provides that the names and addresses of persons who have 
given information to the Commissioner112 with respect to any offence 
under the POBO will be protected. Section 30A(1)(b) provides that no 
witness shall be obliged to disclose the name or address of any informer 
or answer any question if the answer thereto could reveal the name or 
address of such an informer. Section 30A(1) also provides that the court 
shall be entitled to conceal from view or to obliterate any passage from 
any document or paper which has been tendered as evidence in order to 
protect the identity of an informer. It is submitted that such a provision may 
encourage persons to report acts of corruption. In terms of section 
33A(1)(a-d) the court may of its own accord, if it is in the public interest to 
do so, order that a convicted person in a position of the director or 
manager of a public or private body, or a professional person, or a person 
who is a partner or manager in a private firm, may be prohibited from 
being so employed for a period not exceeding seven years. This 
prohibition relates to the conviction of any offence in Part II of the POBO, 
and is not confined to any particular offence. South Africa does not have a 
similar provision. Such a provision could be effective in discouraging the 
immediate re-entry of corrupt persons into the world of commercial 
activities. 
The protection of informers in corruption cases is an important aspect of 
Hong Kong's anti-corruption legislation. Section 18 of the PCCA in South 
Africa creates an offence of unacceptable conduct relating to witnesses, in 
terms of which it is an offence for any person to intimidate, coerce or 
improperly influence a witness or use physical violence against a witness 
in order for such a witness inter alia to testify in a particular way, withhold 
testimony, or delay the testimony of such a witness. However, the PCCA 
does not offer any statutory protection to such witnesses, who may be 
informers and who may be subjected to intimidation for the disclosure of 
information relating to corruption offences. There are similarities between 
the provisions of the PCCA in South Africa and the POBO in Hong Kong. 
However, Hong Kong’s provisions relating to the possession of 
unexplained wealth, the protection of informers, and the prohibition of the 
                                            
112  "Commissioner" refers to the Commissioner of ICAC.  
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employment of convicted persons may also be useful in the fight against 
corruption in South Africa. 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance113 
establishes Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) as envisaged by the Basic Law. The ICAC has been hailed as a 
powerful anti-corruption enforcement body, and as largely responsible for 
the reduction of corruption in Hong Kong.114 The ICAC is an "anti-
corruption agency independent of the police force and civil service".115 In 
terms of section 5 of the ICAC Ordinance, the ICAC Commissioner is 
appointed by the Chief Executive Officer116 and is accountable only to the 
Chief Executive Officer. The terms of office of the Commissioner and the 
Deputy Commissioner are determined by the Chief Executive Officer.117 
By contrast, South Africa does not have an independent agency dedicated 
to anti-corruption efforts.118 While the work of the ICAC has been 
commended and applauded, the legislative framework within which it 
operates has helped to create an environment within which it can be 
effective.  
7 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion shows why Hong Kong is globally acclaimed for 
its efforts in reducing public-sector corruption, and why it can provide 
valuable lessons for combating public procurement corruption in South 
Africa. Hong Kong has specific laws dedicated to public procurement. Its 
Public Finance Ordinance creates a sound legislative basis for 
accountable government expenditure, promotes effective demand 
planning, and creates layers of responsibility within the staff of government 
entities. With respect to tendering, Hong Kong adopts elements of a 
centralised and decentralised tendering system. Depending on the 
threshold of bids, individual departments or a Central Tender Board are 
responsible for awards of government contracts. Regardless of which 
entity is responsible for the procurement in question, Hong Kong has a 
                                            
113  Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance 7 of 1974 (ICAC 
Ordinance). 
114  In this respect, see Manion 2004 China Review 97. 
115  Manion 2004 China Review 84. 
116  The Chief Executive Officer is the administrative head of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. 
117  Sections 5 and 6 of the ICAC Ordinance. 
118  In this regard, refer to the judgment in Hugh Glenister, wherein the Constitutional 
Court held that the Directorate of Priority Crimes located within the South African 
Police Service did not constitute an independent body as envisaged in international 
law. 
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uniform set of laws applicable to all procuring entities. In keeping with 
international procurement principles, the Territory provides for a system of 
public tendering and a committee system responsible for the evaluation 
and adjudication of bids. The challenge system adopted by Hong Kong 
conforms to international best practice, particularly the provisions of the 
WTO GPA, and ensures that the review process affords aggrieved bidders 
an effective recourse mechanism. 
In the specific context of public-procurement corruption, while Hong Kong 
appears to follow similar tendering procedures to those of South Africa, 
there are significant lessons to be learned which may help make the South 
African procurement system less susceptible to corruption. Firstly, Hong 
Kong’s constitutional commitment to eradicating corruption is most 
commendable. Rules pertaining to procurement processes are more 
consistent and are not hidden in a number of legislative prescripts. The 
SPRs are applicable to all government entities. The Public Finance 
Ordinance creates a system which encourages effective demand planning 
and demand management, and allows for more effective monitoring of 
government expenditure against pre-planned procurement requirements. 
The creation of layers of accountability among government officials, as 
opposed to accountability resting with the head of a department, ensures 
that a greater number of officials have an interest in ensuring and 
maintaining integrity in the tender process. Finally, Hong Kong has a 
domestic review system which presents a solution to most of the 
significant review and appeal challenges highlighted in respect of the 
South African system. The existence of an independent administrative 
body obviates the delays occasioned by judicial review. The Rules of the 
Review Body present clear timeframes and procedures to be followed in a 
review. The provision for rapid interim measures ensures that procurement 
reviews do not become mere academic exercises in instances where 
impugned procurement decisions are allowed to be executed prior to the 
finalisation of a review or appeal.  
In respect of Hong Kong’s anti-corruption legislation, in general the 
provisions of the POBO relating to the possession of unexplained wealth, 
as well as those relating to the protection of informers, may provide some 
lessons for South Africa. The prohibition of the further employment of 
convicted persons has merit in ensuring that convicted persons do not 
immediately re-enter the commercial sphere. Hong Kong’s anti-corruption 
agency, the ICAC, has been hailed as an iconic corruption fighting body. 
From a legislative perspective, South Africa may do well to learn from 
Hong Kong’s ICAC in attempting to model its own anti-corruption agency. 
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